Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Historical Working Papers

Cox School of Business

1-1-1980

The Environment for Funds Management Decisions in Coming
Years
George H. Hempel
Southern Methodist University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/business_workingpapers
Part of the Business Commons
This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Cox School of Business at SMU Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Working Papers by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Research ~d Development
School of Business Administration
Southern Methodist Univera1t¥
Pallas, Texas ?5275

THE ENVIRONMENT FOR FUNDS MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS IN COMING YEARS
Working Paper 80-123 *
by
George H. Hempel

Professor of Finance
Edwin L. Cox School of Business
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas 75275

* This

paper represents a draft of work in progress by the author(s) and
is being sent to you for information and review.
Responsibility for the
contents rests solely \vith the author ( s) .
This working paper may not be
reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author(s).
Please address correspondence to George H. Hempel.

It is clearly important to anticipate the environment in which commercial
banks will make funds management decisions during the next several years.

It

is, of course, impossible to predict accurately all aspects of the future environment for funds management decisions; however, we can make some reasonable
inferences about the future environment from economic trends, recent legislation, and developments in the banking industry.

The discussion is divided in-

to three parts -- the economic environment, the regulatory environment, and
trends in the banking industry.
The Economic Environment
The economic environment promises to be challenging for bank funds managers.

It appears likely funds management decisions for the next few years will

have to be made in an environment of slow real economic growth and rapid
(probably double-digit) inflation.

The primary causes of slow real growth in-

clude the low (relative to other developed western economies) capital base of
our economy and the limited probability of productivity gains.

While positive

changes in public and private policies may improve the rate of real growth, it
will take a long time to achieve significant improvement.
Continuing inflation may be cause for even greater concern for bank funds
managers.

Chart 1, which traces the rates of change for the Consumer Price

Index over five-year periods, clearly illustrates the increasing rates of inflation in recent years.

Chart 2 shows the rates of change in the Consumer

Price Index for six-month periods.

This chart illustrates that the rate of

inflation has varied cyclically with higher peaks and higher troughs in each
ensuing cycle.

Six-month rates of change were in double digits throughout

1979 and 1980.

Progress in reducing the rate of inflation appears likely to

be slow, for more and more of our economic activity is indexed to price
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increases.

A balanced Federal budget appears to be an illusory target.

Prices in key areas, such as food and oil, appear likely to be under price
pressures for the next few years.

Finally, our primary hope ·for reduced

inflation -- rational monetary policy -- seems likely to take several years to
achieve significant results.
Two other elements of the corning American economic environment, high interest rates and fluctuating interest rates, appear likely to challenge bank
funds managers in the next several years.

Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the high

correlation between interest rates and the rate of inflation.

Numerous

studies have concluded that longer-term interest rates tend to exceed the expected rate of inflation by two to three percent.

Thus, a prediction of con-

tinued high levels of interest rates -- as high or higher than in 1979 -- is
consistent with our inflationary expectations.
Wide and rapid fluctuation in interest rates also seems very likely in
the early 1980's.

The increasing amplitude of interest rate fluctuations can

be seen by observing the wide fluctuations in the rate on four- to six-month
prime commercial paper in Chart 2 and by following data on changes in the
prime lending rates charged by commercial banks:
Years
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980 (10 months)

Number of Changes
6
10
1
15
65
74
39

The above data understate the magnitude of changes in the prime rate because
changes were usually one-quarter of a percent prior to the late 1970's, while
many prime rate changes in 1979 and 1980 have been one-half or a full percent.
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Continuation of these rapid and wide fluctuations in interest rates seems
likely if the Federal Reserve sticks to its October 6, 1979 declaration.

In

essence, the Fed said it will place more emphasis on controlling reserves and
monetary aggregates and will let interest rates seek their market levels consistent with reserve and monetary goals.

The prime rate was 12 percent on

October 6, 1979, and 18 percent a little over a year later.

During that year,

however, prime has risen to 20 percent, fallen to 11 percent, then risen back
to 18 percent.

Since the rates discussed are increasingly representative of

the borrowing and lending rates on many bank liabilities and assets, funds
management at a bank is likely to become increasingly challenging.
The Regulatory Environment
Passage of HR 4986, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control ACt of 1980, on March 31, 1980 will probably lead to greater changes
in bank funds management than any legislation since the 1930's.

The act in-

cludes nine titles on far-reaching and diverse subjects including monetary
control and reserve requirements, a phaseout of deposit interest-rate ceilings~

nationwide authorization of NOW accounts, expanded asset and liability

powers for thrift institutions, fees for services provided by the Federal Reserve, preemption of state usury laws, and simplification of truth-in-lending.
The purpose in this paper is to describe the primary ways the Act will affect
funds management in coming years.
Table 1 summarizes the primary immediate and longer-run impact on funds
management of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980.

The primary objective of standardization and broader applicabil-

ity of reserve requirements is better control of the money supply.

The lower

percentage requirements applied to more banks and the greater limitation in
the types of deposits covered means ni.ost banks will have increased earning
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assets and, ceteris paribus, increased earnings as a result of this stairstep
change which will be completed for banks and thrift institutions by 1988.

A

small number of banks, and most thrift institutions, will have higher reserves, which will reduce earning assets and hurt earnings.

Longer-run funds

management effects will probably include a more equitable competitive environment and decreased variation of relative growth rates among various types of
deposits.

The Federal Reserve still will not pay interest on reserves left

with it; however, the door for that was partially opened.

The Federal Reserve

can pay a return up to what its securities portfolio earned during the previous calender quarter on accounts above required reserves and on the special
supplemental required reserves (the maximum allowed is 4 percent of transaction accounts) the Federal Reserve is permitted to impose under certain situations.

HR. 498'6 required the Federal Reserve to price its services, such as
check-clearing and collection, settlement, wire transfer, and float, at their
estimated full cost plus a mark-up so that the resulting prices would be similar to those charged by private business.

When the Fed's prices become ef-

fective in 1981, banks will have to pay increased explicit cost to the Fed for
services.

While there is some chance that the demand for Federal Reserve ser-

vices will rise because more bank and thrift institutions may use them, in my
opinion most banks will seek other sources which will provide the needed services in a more efficient (i.e., less costly) manner.
of Federal Reserve pricing will probably include:

The longer-run effects

changes in "cash manage-

ment" practices of banks; further reduction in bank and Federal Reserve float;
greater reliance by correspondent banks on explicit pricing than on balances;
and realistic bank pricing of

retai~

transaction deposit services.

I also be-

lieve that Federal Reserve pricing will provide additional stimulus to electronic banking, i.e., debit cards, direct deposits, ATM's, POS's, etc.
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The approval for NOW accounts nationwide, which is effective at the
beginning of 1981, will lead to higher interest expense for transaction-type
Higher interest expenses may particularly hurt smaller, retailed-

deposits.

oriented banks whose · profitability has been more dependent on having substantial amounts in low-cost demand deposits.

In addition, the reserves on sav-

ings accounts that are switche.d to NOW accounts will be twelve percent for the
transaction accounts rather than three percent for savings accounts.

Never-

theless, in the longer run, NOW accounts also offer positive opportunities to
bank funds management.

Personal transaction balances should be higher and

more stable, and there should be fewer unwanted returned checks and overdrafts.

NOW accounts may be the forerunner of one-account banking.

Setting

the appropriate levels for NOW-pricing factors, such as minimum balances and
any fee and service charges, will be an important funds management decision in
the 1980's.
The gradual phase-out of Regulation Q ceilings, if completed in 1986 according to schedule, will probably have the most far-reaching effect on bank
funds management.

There will probably be a gradual increase in the interest

cost of many types of bank funds, and there will be increased pressures on
bank margins.

The impact will be greatest on many retail banks, which will

find the maximum interest they can pay on nearly all of their bank deposits,
including NOW accounts, rising regularly.

Intense competition from other

banks and thrifts and predicted high intere st raDes in the economy are likely
to keep most banks at these maximums.

Furthermore, competition on the lending

side is likely to keep most banks from maintaining their interest margins.

As

t i me passes, the emphasis in funds acqui s i t i on is l i ke ly to shift f rom quantity to product design and pricing.

There will probably be less variation in
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the relative size and growth of various types of deposits and emphasis on
explicit interest rather than on premiums.
Several other parts of HR 4986 will also affect bank funds management in
The increase in insurance of private deposits from $40,000 to

coming years.

$100,000 will mean higher insurance fees, but should enable banks to better
distinguish their deposit products from competing nonbank products.

Expanded

deposit and lending powers for thrifts should increase competition for obtaining and profitably using bank funds.

!he interest spread between attracting

and employing funds may narrow; however, banks have several key advantages,
such as greater experience and expertise and a more flexible asset structure.
Finally, the section providing for relaxation of existing usury laws in many
states means lending rates can be more consistent with existing market rates.
This relaxation should reduce artificial barriers to funds allocation and
should enhance the ability of banks to hold interest margins stable over the
business cycle.
Changes in funds management as HR 4986 becomes effective should be significant; however, the law has several important deficiencies which may or may
not be resolved by future legislation or regulation.

For example, there is no

provision ror removing the remaining constraints on interstate expans i on by
banks or bank holding companies.

Restrictions now imposed under Glass-

Steagall, such as those aimed at commingled investment accounts, were not a ddressed.

The continuing c ompetitive advantages of mone y market funds were

largely ignored.

The longer-run implications of the fact that low yielding,

fixed-rate mortgages will remain a significant part of the portfolios of most
t hrift inst i tutions and many banks for some years to come was not expl ici tly
considered.

These and similar problems cannot be ignored.

In my opini on, the

problem is that banking legislation and regulation tend to be following, not
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leading, influences on bank funds management.

Legislation and regulation tend

to validate or legitimize successful innovations in the banking and depository
industry.
Looking at current trends, some legislative or regulatory developments
seem likely for the near future.

One is some form of relaxation of state

boundary constraints in providing some financial services.

These constraints

are already partly overcome by Edge Act offices, loan production offices, and
bank holding company subsidiaries, but using such loophole opportunities is
not particularly efficient.

Improved electronic technology and the need for

domestic rather than international takeovers of "weakened" depository institutions should provide added incentives for some kind of legislative or regulatory action.

My prediction is that, before the mid-1980's, we will see at

least regional, and probably nationwide, banking permitted.
I am less optimistic about other legislative relief because HR 4986 was
passed in the crisis environment of March 1980.

The probability of more sig-

nificant bank legislation in the near-term seems low.
learn to live in the regulatory environment of HR 4986.

Banks must instead
Key areas in which

some type of action may be forced on legislative or regulatory bodies include
definitions of nontraditional financial services banks can provide; ground
rules for how far money market funds, brokerage firms, and other nondepository
firms can go in competing with depository institutions without constraint;
payment of interest on reserves; and some form of relief for institutions
holding significant amounts of previously-acquired, low-:·fixed-.return mortgages.
Trends in the Banking Industry
Finally, in reviewing the environment for funds management decisions in
coming years, we need to review the current status of the banking industry
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itself.

How much flexibility will the industry have to face the challenging

external and regulatory environment?
industry in future years?

Will coming technology help or hurt the

Will competitive pressure by intra- or inter-

industry?
Table 2 shows that in 1950, as a result of the Depression and World War
II, commercial banks held over sixty percent of their total assets in cash and
due from banks accounts or in Treasury securities.

At the same time funds

were acquired primarily through checking accounts.

Demand deposits made up

over seventy percent of total liabilities and capital in 1950.

The low aver-

age return of banking assets -- caused by the bank asset mix and low interest
rates -- meant that banks paid relatively low returns on time and savings
deposits and were often not aggressive in trying to obtain funds from such
deposits.
The primary emphasis in bank management during the 1950's and early
1960's was a shift from Treasury securities and cash and due from banks accounts to riskier assets with higher returns.

While there was some increased

emphasis on time and savings deposits as sources of funds, demand deposits
still contributed well over half the total sources of funds for most banks.
Furthermore, total deposits and assets of all commercial banks grew at an annual rate of less than five percent from 1950 through 1964.

During this peri-

od, the combined assets of nonbank financial intermediaries grew at an annual
rate of roughly twelve percent.

Causes of this low growth in banks vis-a-vis

other financial institutions included (1) slow demand deposit growth as corporate treasurers began to utilize efficient cash management techniques; (2)
significantly lower average rates paid on time and savings deposits than those
paid by many other intermediaries ; and (3) generally conservative attitudes
toward attracting funds by bank managers.
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The prevailing philosophy of bank managers and directors appeared to
emphasize the profitable lending of attracted funds, at the cost of additional
risk.

The excess liquidity and low portfolio credit risk of banks during the

immediate postwar period was substantially reduced.

Table 2 illustrates that

from 1950 to 1964 cash and due from banks accounts and Treasury securities
fell from sixty-one to forty percent of bank assets, while loans rose from
thirty-one to forty-nine percent.
In the early and mid-1960's, banks responded to their relatively slow
growth during the preceding decade by (1) requiring loan customers to keep
larger demand deposit balances; (2) paying competitive rates on time and savings accounts within the confines of Regulation Q; and (3) aggressively offering certificates of deposit, savings certificates, and other old and new liability sources.

Emphasis in management shifted from asset selection to the

acquisition of funds -- liability management.

This more aggressive acquisi-

tion of funds was part of a shift in bank strategy away from high margins and
slow growth and toward lower margins with more rapid growth in the early and
mid-1950's.

This shift was encouraged by gradual relaxing of Regulation Q,

which set the maximum rates banks could pay on time and savings deposits, and
by allowing banks to use certificates of deposit and other liability forms to
compete more effectively for funds.

The strong demand for credit from the

mid-1960's through the 1970's allowed banks to employ the substantially larger
amounts of funds they were able to attract.
The surge in asset and loan growth was pronounced -- the rate of asset
growth doubled to rates averaging nearly ten percent annually from 1962
through 1979.

By comparison, in this same period, the assets of nonbank fi-

nancial intermediaries grew at an average annual rate of slightly less than
seven percent.
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The change in the composition and financing of this growth was even more
remarkable.

Demand deposits declined from fifty-five percent of total liabil-

ities and capital in the mid-1960's to slightly under thirty percent of total
liabilities and capital by the end of 1979.

Time and savings deposits in-

creased from thirty-three percent of total liabilities and capital in the
early 1960's to fifty percent by 1979.

Borrowing and other liabilities in-

creased from a relatively small source of funds to nearly fourteen percent of
total liabilities and capital in this same period.

On the asset side, cash

and due from banks accounts and Treasury securities declined absolutely as
well as relatively, while loans continued their rapid growth (increasing from
forty-nine to sixty-one percent of total assets from 1964 through 1979), and
other securities (nearly all of which are state and local issues) increased
rapidly from ten to thirteen percent of total assets.
These broad trends indicate banks will probably be exposed to greater
risk in the early 1980's than they have been at any time since the early Depression years.

Options, such as conversion from low-cost, core demand and

savings deposits to interest-sensitive deposits and shifts from securities to
higher-earning, higher risk loans, have already been partially utilized.
Flexibility of bank funds managers is very limited in the challenging economic
and regulatory environment predicted (in the preceding section) for the
1980's.
Technological changes in the 1980's complicate efforts to predict how
many banks will fare in coming years.

The pace of technological change for

banks has been slower than many predicted in the last few years.

On average,

the industry is still dominated by a paper-based brick-and-mortar, customerbank-employee-interaction delivery system.

There are, however, recent devel-

opments which indicate substantive movement away from this system is taking
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place.

The technology exists to alter banks' delivery systems rapidly.

This

technology consists of advances in computer capabilities, which permit easy
and inexpensive gathering, storing, analyzing, and retrieving of customer data
and of advances in communication hardware and software which permits convenient access to customer records at great distances.

In my opinion, we are at

the threshold of a veritable revolution in the delivery system which has significant implications for banking and bank funds management.
In less than five years, I believe, the vast majority of bank transactions will be by electronic impulse made away from the bank's physical location.

With existing technology, automated clearing housing, direct payroll

crediting, direct bill paying, widespread use of debit cards and POS terminals, and disappearance of float appear highly likely.

The technology exists

and is being implemented by larger firms and their banks.

Furthermore, on a

trial basis, some individuals can sit at home and pay bills, make deposits,
shift among types of deposits, shift form deposits to other financial assets,
etc., all by electronic impulse.
While in the long run I believe this technology will increase productivity and reduce costs in banking, the transition period will be difficult.

This

difficulty is compounded by the trying economic and regulatory environment
predicted for coming years.

Some banks will be willing and able to take the

high costs and risk involved while others may still try to drag their feet.
The foot-draggers may find themselves rapidly becoming noncompetitive.
The preceding statement leads to my final area of discussion concerning
the status of banking -- the competitive environment.

I disagree with the

contention that banks' main competition will come from other banks.

This con-

tention seems to be based on the idea that other depository institutions will
be unable to compete because of their inferior asset position and lack of
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experience in many banking areas and that banks will somehow be protected from
competition of nondepository organizations.
I . believe nearly exactly the opposite will occur.

Some large thrifts

will be very competitive in both attracting and employing funds.

Nondeposi-

tory organizations will use their substantial competitive edge -- less restrictions, no reserves, no capital requirements, ·less regulation -- to offer
more and more banklike financial services.

Some of the nondepository organi-

zations providing banklike services are known.

For example, much has been

written about money market firms, brokerage firms like Merrill Lynch, and
large retail chains such as Sears and Penneys offering competitive financial
services.

Rapid expansion by such organizations in areas competitive with

banks appears likely.

Furthermore, additional organizations, such as ·life in-

surance companies, some large industrial companies, and private pension funds,
are looking carefully

~t

segments of banking services they believe would be

profitable for themselves.
Conclusions
~here

does the combination of a hostile economic environment, a changing

regulatory environment, and some worrisome trends in the banking industry
leave the bank funds manager?

The environment for bank funds management de-

cisions is clearly going to be a challenging one in corning years.

I sincerely

believe, however, the well-managed banks can and will be very successful in
this challenging period.
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